No ground in Afghanistan

When the Taliban signed the Doha Agreement with the Trump administration in 2020, they vowed never to allow Afghanistan to return to the fragmented state it found itself in in the late 1990s. After the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, the world declared mission accomplished and walked away, leaving the way clear for armed extremists like the Taliban. Even after they seized power in 1996, their hold was so fragile that terrorist groups like al-Qaeda were able to operate unhindered. Osama bin Laden was not only tolerated but embraced.

This time, they assured, it would be different. But the promise sounded strange coming from a group considered a terrorist group by many countries, including Portugal. Furthermore, the Taliban was not a cohesive entity, but a coalition of factions that had fought the US-backed government. While there was debate about whether they could be trusted, no one questioned whether they were even capable of maintaining unity and governing.

The response came quickly: days after the agreement, attacks on Afghan forces intensified. Instead of promoting an inclusive peace process, the Taliban took advantage of the American withdrawal to conquer the country by force. The Biden administration continued its policy of abandonment, where the chaotic withdrawal of Western forces exposed the hollowness of the agreement: it wasn't peace, it was the formalization of an exit after twenty years of failed policies, institutionalized corruption, and incompetence.

With the US out, the Taliban began breaking promises. They denied women's rights, forbidding girls from studying beyond the sixth grade and virtually erasing them from public life. On the streets, the morality police punished women who went out alone or who dared to laugh in public. In Washington, these violations elicited little more than occasional reprimands. What really seemed to matter was whether Afghanistan would cease to be a haven for terrorists.

Today, evidence of corruption and ethnic favoritism mounts. A recent report by the US Inspector General accuses the Taliban of embezzling billions in international aid, manipulating exchange rates, forcing NGOs to contract with regime-linked companies, and even diverting support intended for various communities to religious schools and military bases.

Internal divisions are also growing. The Haqqani network, led by the eponymous Interior Minister, presents itself as pragmatic in the face of ideological fervor. They were the most effective fighters against the West, but they are equally motivated by business and profit. In public, Haqqani speaks of unity; in private, he criticizes the supreme leader's rigidity. Tensions are evident in episodes such as the parallel Eid celebrations, marking the end of Ramadan, in two Kabul palaces—a clear sign of a dual power center.

Meanwhile, mass deportations from Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, and Germany are worsening the crisis. Since September 2023, more than four million Afghans have returned, many of them young people who were supporting their families from abroad. They find a collapsing economy and face reprisals: extrajudicial killings of former soldiers, activists, musicians, and journalists.

Poverty and repression are fertile ground for extremist recruitment. The UN already considers ISKP a serious threat, while al-Qaeda, though discreet, is strengthening ties with regional groups such as the Pakistani Taliban, responsible for increasing attacks since 2021. To maintain unity, the Taliban feel forced to adopt strict policies that please their most extreme factions, even at the risk of losing members to rival groups.

Added to this scenario is the devastating impact of the recent earthquakes that struck the country, leaving thousands dead and displaced. The natural disaster further exposed the country's fragility: destroyed infrastructure, hospitals without capacity, and entire populations without access to shelter or food. The Taliban's inability to coordinate humanitarian aid, compounded by distrust in the international community and corruption in the embezzlement of funds, threatens to transform a natural tragedy into an accelerator of the already unfolding social and political crisis.

Herein lies the Taliban dilemma: if they give in to international demands regarding women and minorities, they risk losing members to extremist rivals; if they remain inflexible, they further strengthen these groups. In both cases, extremism wins.

Thus, they are likely to break their last promise to the West: to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a terrorist sanctuary again. In fact, they never intended to comply with the Doha Agreement, as they officially announced in February that they would no longer recognize it.

It remains to be seen how the international community will react. In June, US Ambassador to the UN Dorothy Shea admitted that Afghanistan policy is "under review," but little is expected beyond counterterrorism measures. In March, Washington quietly withdrew the bounty on Haqqani, and the following day, the Taliban were removed from the annual report on national security threats.

In short, the West seems to declare, once again: mission accomplished. History may not repeat itself in detail, but the parallel is unmistakable.