Naval Battles I: Francisco Ribera, the corsair who destroyed the entire Ottoman Navy

" They left me with the mast, the topsail yard, and the foremast yard smashed to pieces; the other masts with so many cannon shots that none of them were of any use; they stripped me so much that even the rigging of the purse seine was needed to fix me, and besides, I was taking on so much water that the soldiers had been pumping as far as Candía, and the Carretina took on a lot of water ." Captain Francisco de Ribera , aboard the battered galleon Nuestra Señora de la Concepción, informed the Duke of Osuna, Viceroy of Sicily, at the end of July of the state of his fleet after a three-day battle against a Turkish armada that would be remembered for centuries. Nothing would be the same at sea from that date on: July 16, 1616.

Ribera brought back the destroyed yards or topsail and fore-rigging yards , that is, the horizontal poles that form the rigging of the galleons to hold the sails, as well as the rest of the unusable masts, and having to use the ropes that hold the mast , the garrett rigging, to be able to repair the rest of the rigging that makes the sails work. All this without taking into account, in addition, the open routes in the hull that forced the crew to bail out water during the entire return voyage to present-day Heraklion in Crete , then called Candia:

“ Tell me how to hurry and take Candia; take me in tow to the Capitana Vieja until I can get ready. 15 soldiers were killed on the Capitana and (wounded) Castillo's sergeant and sailors, almost all of whom are fit now. On the Almiranta, they killed four soldiers and two sailors, and wounded 26; on the Carretina, they killed 10 and wounded 25; on the Capitana Vieja, they killed two; on the Patache, they killed one and wounded two .” It might have seemed a poor record for reaching the port of entry to Crete, where cruise ships and pleasure craft now lay aground, but in reality, it was ridiculous given the circumstances surrounding the three days of relentless battle at Cape Celidonia, on the Anatolian coast, against a Turkish Armada made up of more than 50 galleys and 1,000 men.

Of his fleet, the Capitana, which he governs himself, that is, the galleon Nuestra Señora de la Concepción, has to be towed by the previous Capitana , the San Juan Bautista , another galleon, while the Almiranta, Nuestra Señora de la Anunciación , a ship like La Catherina , which is also taking on water, plus an urqueta, the Santa María de Buenaventura, and the patache El Santiago, which is also being towed, return on their own. Two galleons, two naos, an urqueta and a patache, a total of six vessels against more than 50 galleys, the vessel considered the reference force at the time for naval battles.

In total, six vessels against more than 50 galleys, the vessel considered the reference force at the time for naval battles

They were six one-handed ships, because unlike the galleys, they didn't need the arms of galley slaves to row hard to the beat of the drum, and they had destroyed practically the entire Turkish navy in the Mediterranean. News of the Spanish corsair fleet's exploits would spread around the world . How was it technically possible for a small fleet to have destroyed an entire Ottoman navy in this way? Did such Spanish corsairs really exist in the 17th century? Wasn't privateering a matter for foreign nations like England, France, or the Netherlands ?

The reality is that Francisco Ribera commanded the private fleet of the Duke of Osuna, Pedro Téllez-Girón y Velasco , who had obtained, in an unusual way, the letter of marque from Philip III. Ribera's orders were, in fact, purely privateering: "Reach the bottom of the Mediterranean" in search of the Ottoman Navy, as requested by the Duke of Osuna, understood to be with the incentive of obtaining loot and after the Council of State of Philip III had expressly prohibited the action. The history of the Battle of Cape Celidonia is rich in nuances and defines a somewhat unknown activity at sea of Spanish ships in the 17th century: privateering.

Captain Francisco de Ribera did not belong to the royal navy, nor was he born in a seaport, but in Toledo in 1582, “son of Pedro Fernández de Ribera, a Leonese nobleman, steward of the bishop of Lugo, and Isabel de Medina, native of the Toledo town of Mascaraque”, as F. Javier Sánchez Sánchez recounts in his fascinating biography Francisco de Ribera. The Undefeated Admiral (Renaissance) , published this year.

Orphaned very early, at the age of four, like so many of his generation who had grown up listening in taverns to stories of the Battle of Lepanto, “the greatest occasion that the centuries had seen,” as Miguel de Cervantes would write in the prologue to Don Quixote years later, in 1605. And although fate seemed to destin him to be just another swordsman of the Golden Age, it was precisely a brawl in Toledo , in which he stabbed a man to death and knifed five others, that made him flee to Cadiz, where he enlisted as a soldier in the Armada del Mar Océano , in the fleet of galleons commanded by Luis Fajardo.

There he would learn everything about the sea and war to go from “a resolute swordsman of the Golden Age, to an intrepid corsair captain”, and later be promoted on his own merits to “royal admiral, distinguished for his competence as a general of the Navy and ennobled by the king when he named him a knight of the Order of Santiago”, as F. Javier Sánchez writes, for which the famous Battle of Cape Celidonia against the Ottomans was indispensable.

The success against the Turks and the career of the corsair captain Francisco Ribera himself, before reaching the highest levels of the Navy, cannot be understood without the figure of the Duke of Osuna, Pedro Téllez-Girón y Velasco , who had been appointed Viceroy of Sicily by the Council and Philip III in 1610, after a successful military career in Flanders.

The success and career of the privateer captain Francisco Ribera cannot be understood without the figure of the Duke of Osuna, Téllez-Girón and Velasco.

In Sicily, the Duke of Osuna would interpret his powers as viceroy somewhat as he pleased, in addition to arming three years later precisely the private fleet that Francisco Ribera would command, "who surprisingly obtained a patent from King Philip to operate in privateering thanks to the negotiations carried out with the Count of Uceda, who would keep in exchange a substantial part of the loot," as explained by Carlos Canales and Miguel del Rey , in One-handed ships. The Spanish armada under sail from Cape Celandine to Trafalgar (EDAF).

Privateering was still a private enterprise, except that unlike piracy, it was constantly supervised by the crown that had authorized it and to whom it was held accountable. Privateers, in exchange for loot and other benefits, could not disregard the orders of the kingdom they served regarding who they attacked and when. This, however, is precisely what the Viceroy of Sicily did at Cape Celidonia when he sent the corsair fleet commanded by Ribera " to the bottom of the Mediterranean " against the Ottomans.

The Duke of Osuna interpreted, on the one hand, that the Turks in the Mediterranean were weakened, according to the reports of his spies, and that it was a good opportunity to inflict damage, secure the kingdom's trade in those waters and take loot in passing, for which he arranged his fleet, sending the request to the Council of State with the plan of attacking the Ottomans with sufficient delay so that if he did not receive authorization, as happened, Ribera would have already set sail.

Captain Francisco Ribera's orders were simple: set sail with his six ships toward the heart of the Mediterranean and privateer its waters until they lured a weakened Turkish fleet into battle. Basically, he was to engage in privateering warfare, exactly as the Turks had done against the kingdoms of Spain. What was completely new about this campaign was that it was a one-handed fleet, that is, without the oar- powered galleys that had dominated maritime warfare in the Mediterranean for centuries: a risky mission.

The plan had gone according to plan: “ The ducal fleet set sail on June 15, 1616, and came in sight of Cape Celidonia on the 18th (...) located in the region of Caramania, on the southern coast of Anatolia , bathed by the Sea of Cyprus and close to the last defensive bastion of the Cilician pirates defeated by Pompey the Great ” again according to F. Javier Sánchez. Ribera dedicated himself to attacking ships in those waters, hoping that a “weakened” Ottoman navy would come in search of them; they captured 16 caramuzales loaded with merchandise, and pursued an English renegade known as Suleiman Samson towards the south of Cyprus and to the port of Salinas, where another ten vessels fell. They missed Suleiman , but it didn't matter, because their actions had the desired effect when the governor of Cyprus alerted the Pasha of the Ottoman Navy about the Spanish corsairs.

Around July 1, Ribera learned from a Greek ship sailing from Constantinople that the Ottoman fleet had assembled on the island of Chios, with 45 galleys now in the line and up to 60 expected, which turned the mission from risky to downright suicidal. Even so, the captain explored the possibility of meeting them while they were in port, but the journey was too long, so he returned to Cape Celandine. As Ribera himself reported:

“ So I decided to stay on the cape, believing for certain that the fleet would come looking for me there, and it did, appearing on the 14th of the aforementioned July with 55 galleys. They came to me in terrible haste; as soon as I saw this, I set a flag to gather vessels together; once they were together, I calmed down and gave them the order that the Almiranta, Carretina and Urqueta should always stay together, and if it were a dead calm, they should anchor alongside, and if by misfortune one of them should sink, the others should save its people, and if they were dismasted, they should anchor it, and that in all necessary circumstances they should be helped by one another .”

This was the key to the battle: the Ottoman navy, which initially thought the corsair fleet would try to flee due to the incredible disproportionate number, realized, however, that they were going to unexpectedly attempt to engage in battle. What Francisco de Ribera then proposed was a direct fortress at sea: with his six one-handed ships closely together, forming a closed circle.

What Francisco de Ribera then proposed was directly a fortress at sea with his six one-handed ships very close together alongside

As expected, the Turkish galleys launched themselves with the intention of boarding, which was their advantage due to their maneuverability and number, but as all the ships were together it was almost impossible, even more so when Ribera ordered them to fire in the Spanish style: that is, instead of doing it at cannon range , they waited and when they began to approach they fired all the cannons at ground level to sweep the Turkish vessels from very close range:

As Carlos Canales and Miguel del Rey point out: “There were solid iron bullets to open leaks in hulls, bullets with blades to tear out cables and antennas, but perfect for doing the same to arms or heads, limestone projectiles that broke upon impact, their remains flying through the air like shrapnel, boats with nails, pieces of metal and steel balls, and even dismasting projectiles, made of iron balls joined by chains , which tore out masts, destroyed sails, and had a devastating effect on the crews of the galleys and the soldiers who were concentrated in the ruins.”

These were three days of relentless resistance to the Ottoman onslaught, which proved more like hell for the Turkish galleys , as their assault attempts repeatedly met the enormous firepower of the "one-handed ships," which, in addition to cannons, also had muskets and the advantage of their height. Even so, the three days of cannon fire also began to take their toll on the rigging of the galleons and ships, but nothing comparable to the immense loss the Ottomans were receiving. At three o'clock in the afternoon on the third day, according to Ribera, the battered galleys withdrew. They had lost 11 galleys and another 15 were unserviceable, to the point that eight of them sank before reaching Lebanon, where they had retreated. In total, 1,200 Turkish combatants were dead, and with them, almost 2,000 galley slaves, while the Spanish fleet had lost 43 soldiers and 28 sailors.

Although the two galleons had been left almost useless, and the rest of the ships were in very poor condition, they had all returned. It was evident that Cape Celidonia had constituted an absolute victory over the Ottoman navy, which was practically swept away. The news spread around the world, and with it the superiority of these one-handed ships over the old galleys . However, despite Ribera's great feat, which inspired a play by Luis Vélez ( The Wonder of Turkey and the Brave Toledo) , the Council of State did not consider changing the function of the galleons in the Royal Navy's military actions and kept the galleys despite the fact that, in the minds of the Mediterranean world, the battle revolutionized the concept of the military superiority of galleys over ships.